An Application o=
f Mary
Douglas’ Pollution Theories towards a Definition of “Monsters,&=
#8221;
Using the Case Example of Daniel 7
Frances Flannery-Dailey
This article is
dedicated to the memory of Jonathan A. Goldstein (1929-2004).
=
In
her pioneering work on pollution theory, anthropologist Mary Douglas makes =
the
now axiomatic observation that “dirt is matter out of place,”
meaning that “there is no such thing as dirt,” except as a soci=
ally
constructed category of items and circumstances that blurs the normative
orderings of a given society (Douglas 2004: xvii, 44-50). These findings ab=
out
pollution apply equally well to another classification of anomalies,
“monsters,” aberrant imaginary beings appearing in nearly (if n=
ot
every) society and religion. Researchers such as Timothy Beal, David Gilmor=
e,
and Geoffrey Galt Harpham have explicitly applied Mary Douglas’ views=
of
“dirt” and anomaly towards their study of monsters; hence Harph=
am
defines “grotesques” as possessing both strange and recognizable
features with “much corrupted or shuffled familiarity” (Harpham=
5).
(Beal 183; Gilmore 16-19; Harpham 56-57). Other scholars, while not relying
directly on Douglas’ pollution theories, have still arrived at similar
definitions of monsters as beings who embody unnatural combinations of parts
(Mode 7), exhibiting “l’agglutination des images” in a
dreamlike fashion (Volmat, as quoted in Kappler 283). Jeffrey Cohen’s
description of monsters as “disturbing hybrids whose externally
incoherent bodies resist attempts to include them in any systematic
structuration” (6) sounds much like Douglas’ discussion of the
pangolin, which the Lele treat as a sacred creature, since it
“contradicts all the most obvious animal categories” and is =
220;ambiguity
in an extreme and concentrated form” (Douglas 2004: 208, 210). Thus,
implicitly or explicitly,
=
Arguably, the core of Douglas’=
; work
in Purity and Danger (1966), in which she outlined her
pollution theories most fully, is the assertion that culturally defined
standards of pollution and purity, particularly as inscribed on individual
bodies, reflect larger structures and dynamics of concomitant societies:
“Where there is dirt, there is system” (Douglas 2004: 44). Echoing other scholarship on the b=
ody
(Foucault 1977: 26-27; Butler 1993:34; Grosz 1994:x, 3 in Yeğenoğ=
lu
91), Douglas treats the body as a microcosm of society, whose construction
reflects societal fears and perceptions of social boundaries as permeable f=
rom
within or without, or as confounded internally (Douglas 2004: 141-195). I endeavor to apply these observations=
from
Review of Schola=
rship
on the Study of Monsters
&=
nbsp; According to art historians,
monsters have been a subject of human imagination at least from the beginni=
ngs
of civilization in Egypt and Mesopotamia (Mode 12), perhaps even appearing =
in
Paleolithic cave art in France and Spain just after Homo sapiens appears in western Europe (Leroi-Gourhan 54-55 in
Gilmore 24). It seems that every culture has had its monsters, and recent
scholars have focused serious attention on the implications of these imagin=
ary
beings, even holding an international series of conferences on the topic
(www.wickedness.net/Monsters/monsters.htm). While there is general agreement
that it is a disconcerting fusion of images and forms that classifies a bei=
ng
as a “monster” (e.g. Gilmore 6-8; Mode 18, 29), there are multi=
ple
disciplinary perspectives and approaches through which one may understand t=
he
significance of these forms. It is helpful to classify these approaches in =
four
categories, which analyze monsters primarily in terms “o/Other,”
“self,” “both other and self,” or “society or
culture.”[1]
The following summary of scholarship, which is suggestive rather than
exhaustive, helps contextualize the methodology of my study.
=
First,
scholars in an array of disciplines frequently approach monsters in terms of
their embodiment of strangeness as “o/Other,” since most focus =
on
an ontological definition of monster bodies as recombinant, unnatural hybri=
ds,
(e.g. Mode in art history, 7 or Harpham in literature, 3-5). Rudolph
Otto’s work in the study of religion on the divine as mysterium tremendum, das Unheimliche, and ganz Andere has proven highly
influential in casting monsters as Other, as one may glean from Beal’s
coining of the term “monstrum
tremendum” (Beal 6). Indeed, Otto concluded that biblical monsters
are the counterpart of the divine, stating: “the ‘monstrousR=
17;
is just the ‘mysterious’ in a gross form” (Otto 25, 82).
Philosopher Réné Girard relates monsters to a “divine
Other,” viewing God and scapegoats (societal victims or
“monsters”) in terms of the supreme ethical Otherness (Girard i=
n
=
The
second category, “monster as self,” is typified by psychoanalyt=
ical
approaches, especially Freudian ones, which view monsters as manifestations=
of
inner psychological motives and urges (Klein 249; Mull=
y
37-48). For instance, David Gilmore, who draws on the work of Freud as well=
as
on Mary Douglas, Victor Turner and Réné Girard, still conclud=
es,
“The monster is the super-id. . . our monsters are our innermost selv=
es”
(194). The view that monsters generally reflect our own psyches is not limi=
ted
to psychology as a discipline. I suspect that many treatments of monsters as
symbols in literary criticism make this presumption, and that comparative
mythologies such as those of Joseph Campbell (1968) find cross-cultural
similarities in monsters where they might instead emphasize difference
precisely because of a presupposition that monsters are simply manifestatio=
ns
of a human psyche that is fundamentally similar diachronically and
synchronically.
=
The
third approach, “monster as both other and as self,” has been
implicit to varying degrees in the work of postmodern philosophers such as
Julia Kristeva, in that the distinction between=
Self
and Other (and Transcendent/ Abject) has been collapsed (Kristeva
11-18 in Kearney 89-91). Reflecting on the work of Kri=
steva
and other theorists of the postmodern sublime,
=
The
fourth category of scholarship analyzes monsters as they shed light on soci=
ety
and culture. Historical studies have naturally favored such an approach in
highly specific contexts, investigating such topoi as
Siamese twins and American democracy (Pingree) =
and
hermaphrodites in sixteenth century
=
While
each of the categories contains approaches that have merit for the study of
religion and monsters, all may result in reductionism of one sort or anothe=
r.
Category one (monsters as other) often presumes a transcendent divine that =
is
not useful for some religions, such as Zen Buddhism or monistic forms of
Hinduism. Categories two (monsters as self) and three (monsters as both oth=
er
and self) tend to internalize or personalize the discussion and thus ignore=
the
influence of individual societal contexts when addressing religions contain=
ing
monsters. Clearly, some studies cited for category four (monsters and socie=
ty /
culture) might still reduce religion to the Marxist opiate of the masses (L=
aw)
or to the monstrous divine of the postmodern age (&=
1;ižek).
=
What
is needed is a definition that is culturally specific but that allows for
cross-cultural comparisons in its schema. Clifford Gee=
rtz
has proposed a helpful definition of religion that allows for some
cross-cultural comparison, while still locating religions in particular
societies, as follows: “A set of symbols which acts to establish
powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in [people] by
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations =
seem
uniquely realistic” (Geertz 90). Similarl=
y, a
fruitful approach for illuminating the significance of monsters in a vast a=
rray
of religions and cultures should account for the particular meanings in
individual systems. To this end, I propose the following definition of
monsters, inspired by Mary Douglas’ findings that the structures of particular cultural systems are
suggested by their concomitant pollution systems, which label as
“dirt” that which is “interstitial,”
“anomalous” and “ambiguous” (Douglas 2004: 127-130,
47-50).
A Tentative Defi=
nition
of “Monster”
&=
nbsp; “Monster” is a soc=
ially
constructed category of imagined, mythic being whose main characteristics
(usually ontology and/or behavior) either hybridize normative categories to=
a
culturally significant degree, or exist liminally in
the interstices of those categories. By its very disorganization, then, the
monster as a site of discourse implies, whether by challenging and/or reify=
ing,
a culturally specific set of normative boundaries within and surrounding
society, thereby illuminating the structure and dynamics of particular
religions, social organizations, worldviews, and/or ethics.
Applying the
Definition
&=
nbsp; To illustrate the usefulness a=
nd
applicability of this definition, I now turn to an analysis of the dream
creatures in Daniel 7. Although fictitiously set in the earlier Babylonian
period, this Hellenistic Jewish text stems from approximately 167-164 B.C.E=
.,
the period of the Seleucid ruler Antiochus IV Epiphane=
s’
severe persecution of the Jews. Antiochus had proscribed the Torah, torturi=
ng
and killing observant Jews, and had somehow desecrated the Holy of Holies in
the
=
Daniel
7 depicts the seer experiencing a symbolic dream in which four composite be=
asts
emerge from the sea, a liminal place associated=
in
Mesopotamian, Egyptian and Ugaritic mythology w=
ith
the primordial forces of chaos and chaos monsters (Beal 2004: 25-30; Day
151-156). The passage describing these four creatures must be quoted in full
for our purposes:
The first was like a lion but had eagles’ wings. A=
s I
looked on, its wings were plucked off, and it was lifted off the ground and=
set
on its feet like a man and given the mind of a man (7:4). Then I saw a seco=
nd,
different beast, which was like a bear but raised on one side, and with thr=
ee
fangs in its mouth among its teeth; it was told, ‘Arise, eat much
meat!’ (7:5). After that, as I looked on, there was another one, like=
a
leopard, and it had on its back four wings like those of a bird; the beast =
had
four heads, and dominion was given to it (7:6). After that, as I looked on =
in
the night vision, there was a fourth beast – fearsome, dreadful, and =
very
powerful, with great iron teeth – that devoured and crushed, and stam=
ped
the remains with its feet. It=
was
different from all the other beasts which had gone before it; and it had ten
horns (7:7). While I was gazi=
ng
upon these horns, a new little horn sprouted up among them; three of the ol=
der
horns were uprooted to make room for it. There were eyes in this horn like
those of a man, and a mouth that spoke arrogantly (7:8) (JPS).
=
Biblical
scholars have proposed many referents for these images, including Ugaritic myths (Cross; Day; Collins 1993); Persian
influence (Bousset); Babylonian myths and astro=
logy (Kvanvig); Hellenistic astrology (Caquot)
and Egyptian religion (Gressman). Lions, eagles=
, and
leopards are common symbolic animals in ancient Near Eastern cultures (alth=
ough
bears are rare), and composite zoomorphic creatures are familiar as well.
Biblical scholars are basically united in interpreting the sequence of
composite animals in Daniel 7 as representing a sequence of kingdoms:
Babylonians, Medes, Persians, and the despised Hellenistic kingdom of the
author’s time (Collins 1993: 295; Day 151-152). The interpretation of=
the
fourth creature as the Seleucid kingdom is secured by the horn imagery,
typically associated with both divinity and rulership<=
/span>
in the ancient Near East and Hellenistic world and appearing on the coins of
some Seleucid rulers, who are wearing horned helmets (Day 156; Collins 1993:
299; cf. 1 En 90:9 and Zech
2:1-4).
&=
nbsp; Clearly,
the monstrous creatures in Daniel resonate with a plethora of intertextual symbols from pagan nations, but can any
additional insights be gleaned through attending to ancient Jewish texts and
culture? What do these hybrid animals signify for the author and original
Hellenistic Jewish audience of Daniel 7 within the context of
=
Mary
Douglas has already applied her theories of pollution and purity in conside=
ring
the classification of animals in the sacrificial system of ancient <=
st1:country-region>
=
These
conclusions shed enormous light on the hybrid creatures in Daniel 7. Certai=
nly,
it is clear from numerous studies associating the creatures with mythic ima=
gery
from pagan empires of the ancient Near East that the creatures illustrate t=
he
domination and threat of pagan empires over Israel, an idea made explicit i=
n an
angelic interpretation of the vision in Dan 7:17-27. But aside from the cognate pagan
literature, the monsters’ very bodies make the same point, since in
Daniel 7 the pagan nations are symbolized specifically by unclean animals in
interstitial states. Although Gilmore has recently concluded that monst=
ers
are always pictured as malevolent eaters (Gilmore 176-186), I propose that =
in
the context of Hellenistic Judaism the creatures in Daniel 7 are better
identified in terms of what may or =
may
not be eaten. Through attending to the creatures’ very
disorganization of matter, one could almost infer from the monsters the
=
The
first creature in Daniel 7 is a hybrid of land animal (lion) and sky animal=
(a
bird’s wings), whereas Leviticus separates the land animals from thos=
e in
water and from the birds (Lev 11:2, 9, 13; cf. Gen
=
Finally,
the worst beast of all is also a hybrid with too many parts – ten hor=
ns,
with one new horn, moreover, having eyes and a mouth like a human. The prie=
stly
classifications are not only concerned with clean animals having the right
number of parts and characteristics (e.g. Lev 11: 1-8), they are very conce=
rned
to keep the categories of land, water, and air animals separate (Lev 11:1-2=
3)
and, of course, to keep animals and humans ontologically separate by preven=
ting
tebhel or “mixing, confusion”=
; (Lev
18:23).
=
One
implication of the symbolic associations between unclean, interstitial hybr=
id
creatures and pagan nations, a connection that is made explicit in Daniel 7=
:17,
is that the disorganization of the monsters’ bodies suggests several =
of
the proper ontological categories in the Israelite view of the cosmos, name=
ly
unmixed humans and animals, unmixed clean and unclean animals. Other beings=
in
the dream suggest additional categories of being. The appearance of the
creatures in Daniel 7:2-8 is juxtaposed to the enthronement scene of a divi=
ne
being in 7:9ff, a scene that in Hellenistic Jewish texts typically takes pl=
ace
in the
=
Against
this background, the hybrid creatures in Daniel’s dream vision establ=
ish
the claim that, like unclean and interstitial animals, the pagan nations are
excluded from access to God. Their exclusion from divine space is accentuat=
ed
through their juxtaposition with not only the anthropomorphic Ancient of Da=
ys,
a representation of God drawn from the aged Ugaritic
El (Day 161; Collins 1993: 290-292), but also the Baal-inspired “One =
like
a human being,” the angel to whom is given dominion (Dan 7:9, 13; see
Cross 16-17; Day 167). These anthropomorphic divine figures clearly operate=
on
the side of
The ordering of the cosmos aro=
und a
temple casts new light on a familiar image. The Ancient of Days sitting on =
the
throne of the (heavenly/earthly)
=
This
reading accounts for an anomaly in the text that has puzzled interpreters. =
The
enthronement scene clearly contains the wheeled merkabah throne (7:9), heavenly hosts (
=
Overall,
the bodies of the beings in Daniel 7 imply a whole ontological spectrum of
purity in terms of access to God, a hierarchy that establishes boundaries
within the entire cosmos, according to a temple centered and priestly
viewpoint. I sketch this ontological spectrum as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------=
---------
II. A.
B. Zoomorph=
ic
Angels
--------------------------------------------------------=
---------
III. A. =
; Israelites
(High priest, priests, and people in that order)
B. Pagan na=
tions
--------------------------------------------------------=
--------
IV. A. =
Clean
animals honored by sacrifice
B. Unclean
animals, abominable for Israelites
--------------------------------------------------------=
--------
V. &nbs=
p; MONSTERS:
hybrids of various sorts
The classifications of this
ontological gradient are implied by the bodies and relative status of the
various beings in Daniel 7. At the top is, of course, God, who may be
symbolized by the Ancient of Days. According to 7:9, that being has zoomorp=
hic
qualities in its wooly hair, but is primarily anthropomorphic, with not onl=
y a
head and hair, but also a garment, which, obviously, humans rather than ani=
mals
wear. On Tier II of the ontological gradient are the angels, and the “=
;One
like a human being” (
=
Although
not explicitly mentioned in Daniel, throughout Israelite and Hellenistic Je=
wish
texts, zoomorphic-anthropomorphic c=
herubim
typically support the Glory of God on the merkabah throne (e.g., Ezek 1-3, 8-10; 1
En 14; 4Q403 and 4Q405; cf.=
the
Ark in Exodus 25:17-22), and their presence may be implied here. Moreover, I
think the zoomorphic angels (II. B.) are symbolized by the four hybrid
monsters, which not only symbolize the pagan nations but also their patron
“princes,” commonly held in Hellenistic Judaism to be the
protecting angels assigned by God over other nations (e.g. Deut 32:8-9;
Next, on the human tier of exi=
stence
(III A and B), it is clear that Israelites are more ontologically pure than=
are
humans from the nations, since Israelites may only consume clean animals
sacrificed to the one God in the sacred Temple, whereas the pagan nations
consume by unclean animals. As the saying goes, “you are what you
eat,” and the layering of pagan nations / angelic princes with unclea=
n,
hybrid monsters reinforces this truism. On Tier IV are the clean animals vs.
unclean animals, all of which are “good” (Genesis 1), but which
have differing “cleanness” that distinguishes their access to d=
ivine
presence and divine space.
Finally, Tier V consists of the
monsters, the anomalous hybrids. As I have said, creatures along the cosmic
hierarchy are all “good” but differ in status and ontological
purity in their proximity to God. The hierarchy of God, angels, humans, ani=
mals
sketched above is congruent with biblical views, operating on the premise t=
hat
although God loves and has created animals, only human beings are created in
God’s image (Gen
=
This
schema aptly illustrates the internal analogic
correspondences of Daniel 7. The A=
ncient
of Days of Israel is primarily anthropomorphic but with hair recollecti=
ng a
clean animal, sitting on a fiery t=
hrone
reminiscent of altar, which evokes the image of the clean sacrifices that only Israelites
may consume (linking nos. IA and B, IIA, IIIA, IVA). The anthropomorphic an=
gel
“like a human being̶=
1; is
clearly on the side of the Israeli=
te,
whose body is an altar that consumes only clean
animals, etc. (nos. IIA, IIIA, IVA). Conversely, the Ancient of Days also controls the pagan nations, linked to unclean
animals that only they may eat (Lev 11:2); and the nations are protected
and symbolized by unclean hybrid
monsters (linking nos. I A and B, IIB, IIIB, IVB, V). The typological l=
ogic
works in further detail, for example, in that just as the members of pagan
nations consume unclean animals, the primary activity of the second and fou=
rth
beats is devouring unsacrificed animals in acco=
rdance
with a divine command: “Arise, eat much meat!” (Dan 7:5, cf. v.=
7,
linking IIB, IIIB, IVB and V). &=
nbsp;
Two other important points der=
ive
from the ontological hierarchy of the cosmos as suggested by Daniel 7. Firs=
t,
the divine Ancient of Days embodies characteristics inscribed on the rest of
the tiers of creation, angelic, human, animal and hybrid, and thus stands a=
bove
all of creation but not apart from creation. Second, the implicit ordering =
of
kinds of ontology suggests we must give careful attention to the various ki=
nds
of animal hybrids in the dream, perhaps ranking them as well.
The first beast is primarily a
fusion of lion and eagle, but was made to stand up “on its feet like a
man and given the mind [or heart] of a man (<=
span
lang=3DHE dir=3DRTL style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Arial;mso-bidi-la=
nguage:
HE'>אנש ולבב)”=
; (Dan
7:4). Regarding this statement,
=
The
implied superiority of this “human hearted” creature to the sec=
ond
and third beasts suggests the following ordering in Tier V:
=
A.
Hybrids that are substantially human, with animal parts,
=
B.
Hybrids that are mixtures of animal-animal parts.
Since as we have seen the priestly view in general abhor=
s mixing
categories of animals and humans, all of these combinations classify as
“monsters,” at the lowest thresholds of acceptable beings.
Furthermore, it should follow that a creature that is substantially an anim=
al,
with only the accretion of human characteristics, should be the most unclea=
n of
all Creation. And thus we come to the lowest rank of ontological purity,
=
C.
Hybrids that are substantially animal, with anthropomorphic features.
This is an apt description of the fourth and worst beast=
.
=
By
analogy with the rest of the angelic realm of Daniel 7, the humanoid mouth =
and
eyes on the “little horn” representing Antiochus IV must indica=
te
some relationship to Judaism, since the “one like a human being”
champions Israel while the pagan nations are represented by beasts. In the =
case
of the human hearted Babylonian bea=
st,
the human element was essential, thereby demonstrating Nebuchadnezzar’=
;s
conversion to Judaism (according to tradition). However, in biblical thinki=
ng,
and thus presumably in Hellenistic Jewish thinking as well, the eyes and mo=
uth
were not associated with the mind, which was located in the heart and torso
(Douglas 1999: 80) but rather with the senses. Hence, vestiges of human sen=
se
organs incongruously imposed on an animal horn, by contrast with the human
hearted lion-eagle of the Babylonian Empire, should point to a beastly
perversion by Antiochus IV in terms of expressing some kind of relationship
with Judaism.[3]
=
There
may be historical evidence on which to ground this interpretation. Jonathan
Goldstein proposed the thesis that Antiochus painted himself as a reformer and fulfiller of a purifi=
ed
Judaism, ludicrous as this is from the point of view of the Torah observant
Jews whom he ordered tortured and killed (Goldstein 1976: 140-141). Basing =
his
program of prohibiting the Torah through capital punishment on the Roman
suppression of the Bacchanalia, Antiochus attempted to rid Judaism of its
anti-social, monotheistic tendencies based on apparently primitive rituals
(Goldstein 1976: 105-140). According to Goldstein, Antiochus did so in the
guise of a religious reform that would return Judaism to its rational, Mosa=
ic
origins: “Antiochus appears to have believed that he would have to im=
pose
a restored uncorrupt cult of the God of the Jews upon the Chosen People. In=
so
doing, not only might he restore order; he might also win the favor of the =
true
deity or deities of the Jews!” (1976: 141).
According to the accounts in D=
aniel,
the historical Antiochus then presumed to enter the Holy of Holies to erect=
on
the altar an idolatrous construction called “the host” (tsaba, Da=
n 8:12,
13, 10:1), “abominations from desolation” (šiqqutsim mšwmm,
9:27), “the abomination from desolation” (=
haššiqquts mšmm=
,
11:31), “abomination of desolation” (šiqquts šwmm, 12:11) and
“desolation” (šwm, 9:27) (following Goldstein 1976: 143). Accordi=
ng
to corresponding accounts in First Maccabees, t=
he
structure was erected on the “pagan altar” (bômos) which stood on the Jewish sacrificial altar (I Macc 1:59; 1976: 144). The author of this Hellenistic
Jewish text considered the stones of the pagan altar to be
“defiled,” the same verb typically translated “to be made
unclean” (I Macc 4:43-46; 1976:144). Gold=
stein
further relates that later rabbinic commentary referred to “the stone=
s of
the altar which the Greeks made abominable for the purpose of idolatry,R=
21;
causing Goldstein to conclude: “Hence we may learn that the
‘uncleanness’ was the uncleanness of ‘abomination,’
i.e. of idolatry” (1976: 144). What I wish to underscore is that the =
action
of Antiochus is perceived by the authors of First Macc=
abees
and Daniel as well as by later rabbis in terms of “uncleanness,”
perversion of sacrifice, and “abomination,” that is, in terms of
those categories of sacrifice fitting “non-Israelites” in both
Leviticus and in the ontological spectrum of purity sketched above.
=
To
return directly to the lens provided by the monsters, we see that the
ontological confusion and resulting uncleanness of the fourth beast supports
Goldstein’s historical conclusions surprisingly well. The hybrid four=
th
beast with an aggressive horn and
seemingly human sight and speech has apparently deluded itself into
thinking it speaks and sees for Judaism. However, it stands in ontological
tension with the anthropomorphic “one like a human being,” who =
does
have access to sacred space, as well as with other beings which may enter t=
he
temple precincts: Israelites who consume only clean animals sacrificed in
sacred space, the clean animals themselves, and even the human-hearted firs=
t beast.
The horn’s perversion is completed when it tries to gain access to the sacred space of the
=
Finally,
consonant with “monster logic,” sacrificial imagery is complete=
ly
inverted when the judgment of the Ancient of Days results in the destructio=
n of
this fourth beast: “its body was destroyed and it was consigned to the
flames” (
Conclusion
=
In
the definition I proposed, I asserted the following: “By its very
disorganization . . . the monster as a site of discourse implies, whether by
challenging and/or reifying, a cult=
urally
specific set of normative boundaries within and surrounding society,
thereby illuminating the structure and dynamics of religion, social
organization, societal worldview, and/or ethics.” These propositions
appear to hold up when the bodies and functions of the hybrid creatures of
Daniel 7 are examined with an eye towards the religion and society of Second
Temple Judaism. The ontological hybridity of the
monsters of the pagan nations, as juxtaposed to the humanoid angels who
champion
=
Our
monster lens also sheds some light on history. First, the hybridity
of the monsters in Daniel 7 is a fitting symbol of the religious syncretism
that deeply characterized the Babylonian, Median, Persian and Hellenistic
cultures. Second, the highly aggressive monster bodies made of unclean anim=
als
are evidence of a deep fear of contamination of Jewish bodies from the outs=
ide
in the form of carefully regulated consumption of only clean animals (see D=
an
1:8-16). According to Douglas, this is evidence that the (Jewish) society of
the time fears invasion (2004: 152-156), which fits very well with the
historical evidence of Antiochus IV’s pervasive encroachment on Jewish
physical and religious space, particularly in the accounts of forced
consumption of pork (see 4 Macc 5:1-6:28). Thir=
dly, I
have argued that evidence from the zoomorphic-anthropomorphic monster bodie=
s buttresses
some historical arguments made by Goldstein about Antiochus IV’s prog=
ram
of religious revisionism.
=
Overall,
I hope to have shown that attention to the relationship of monsters and soc=
iety
has much fruit to bear in biblical studies and in the study of religion in
general. Monsters are a potent key for unlocking not only the self-identity=
of
the creators of monster texts, but also larger religious, social and cultur=
al
dynamics and structures. The definition attempted here might be applied to =
a wide
range of monster texts (including visual ones), since monsters are found in
every religion and society. Perhaps a systematic application in multiple
contexts might eventually reveal something about the ways in which monsters
function in general.
WORKS CITED
Andriano, Joseph D. Immortal Monster: The Mythological Evolution of the
Fantastic Beast in Modern Fiction and Film.
1999.
Beal, Timothy. R=
eligion
and Its Monsters.
Bousset, Wilhelm. Die Himmelreise de=
r
Seele.
Buchgesel=
lschaft, 1960.
Campbell, Joseph. The
Hero with a Thousand Faces. 2nd ed.
Caquot, Andre. “Sur
les quatre bêtes de Daniel VII.” In=
Semitica 5
(1955): 5-13.
Collins, John J. Daniel:
A Commentary on the Book of Daniel.
Fortress, 1993.
_____. Does the =
Bible
Justify Violence?
Cohen, Jeffrey J. “Monster Culture (Seven
Theses).” In Monster Theory:
Reading
Culture, J.
J. Cohen, ed.
1996.
Cross, Frank Moore. Canaanite
Myth and
the
Religion of
Day, John. God&#=
8217;s
Conflict with the Dragon and the Sea: Echoes of a Canaanite
Myth in the Old Testament.
Doniger, Wendy. Dreams, Illusions and Other Realities.
=
_____. Other
People’s Myths.
Douglas, Mary. L=
eviticus
as Literature.
First edition, 1999.
_____. Purity and
Danger.
Fardon, Richard. Mary Douglas: An Intellectual Biography.
=
1999.
Hellenistic
and Roman Eras.
Fletcher-Louis, Crispin. All
the Glory of Adam: Liturgical Anthropology in the
Freud, Sigmund. =
The
Interpretation of Dreams.
Reprinted from the Standard Edition.
Psychoanalysis, 1953. First German edition, Die Traumdeutung<=
/span>.
Geertz, Clifford. “Religion as=
a
Cultural System.” In The
Interpretation of
Cultures: Selected Essays.
Gilmore, David. =
Monsters:
Evil Beings, Mythical Beasts, and All Manner of
Imaginary
Terrors.
Girard, René. The
Scapegoat.
=
1986.
Goldstein, Jonathan. First
Maccabees: A New Translation with Introduction =
and
Commentary.
Anchor Bible Commentary.
_____. Second
Commentary.
Anchor Bible Commentary.
Gressman, Hugo. Der Messias. FRLANT 78; Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht<=
/span>, 1929.
Harpham, Geoffrey Galt. On
the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art
and
Literature.
Himmelfarb, Martha. Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses.
Jewish Publication Society
1999.
Kappler, Claude. Monsters,
Démons et Merveille=
s
à la Fin Du =
Moyen Age.
Kearney, Richard. Strangers,
Gods and Monsters.
Klein, Melanie. =
Love,
Guilt and Reparation & Other Works 1921-1945. =
Delacorte
Press / Seymour
Kristeva, Julia. Powers of Horror: An Essay in Abjection.
=
University
Press, 1982.
Kvanvig, Helge. Roots of Apocalyptic: The Mesopotamian
Background of the
Enoch Figure and the Son of
1988.
Lebram, J.C.H. “Apokalyptik
und Hellenismus im =
Buche Daniel.” In Vetus
Testamentum 20 (1970): 503-24.
Long, Kathleen Perry. “Hermaphrodites Newly
Discovered: The Cultural
=
Monsters
of Sixteenth-Century
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Inhuman. Stanford:
=
1987.
Morray-Jones, Christopher. “Transformational Mysticism =
in the
Apocalyptic
-Merkabah=
Tradition.” In Journal of Jew=
ish
Studies 43 (1992): 1-31.
Mode, Heinz A. F=
abulous
Beasts and Demons.
Mully, Wilfrid=
a
A. “The Unwanted Possession: The Origin of Monsters from a
=
Psychoanalytic
Point of View.” In Manlike Mo=
nsters
on Trial: Early
Records
and Modern Evidence. Marjorie
Halpin and Michael Ames, eds.
=
Otto, Rudolph. T=
he
Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor
in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational. <=
/i>
Pingree, Allison. “
=
Ninteenth-Century Ideologies of Democracy and
Domesticity.”
=
In
Monster Theory. 92-114.
Yeğenoğlu, Meyda.
“Sartorial Fabric-ations: Enlightenment a=
nd
Western
=
Feminism.”
In Postcolonia=
lism, Feminism and Religious Discourse,
Laura Donaldson and Kwok Pui-Lan eds.
=
82-99.
Žižek<=
span
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:Arial'>, Slavoj<=
/span>. The Plague of Fantasies.
=
NOT=
ES
[1] Compare the thematic categories proposed by Co=
hen in
terms of “theses”: The Monster’s Body is a Cultural Body;=
The
Monsters Always Escapes, The Monster Dwells at the Gates of Difference; The
Monster Polices the Borders of the Possible; Fear of the Monster is Really a
Kind of Desire; The Stands at the Threshold. . . of Becoming (Cohen 4-20). =
[2] Interpreting the beasts as symbols of both the
nations and of the patron angels of the nations helps make some sense of the
later move made by the author of Revelation. Here, the evil angelic power
behind the Beast that represents the
[3] I am indebted on several points in my articula=
tion
of Tier V A,B and C to the students in my “Religion and Monsters̶=
1;
class at Hendrix College, particularly Kari Thompson, Lindsay Porter and Le=
na
Burkett.
The Year 2005 Proceedings of t= he ASSR-SW