Sacrifice, Faith, and Freedom
Jon K. Loessin
Instructor of Behavioral Science
No science will give them br=
ead
as long as they remain free, but in the end they will lay their freedom at =
our
feet and say to us: ‘Better that you enslave us, but feed us.’ =
They
will finally understand that freedom and earthly bread in plenty for everyo=
ne
are inconceivable together… There are three powers, only three powers=
on
earth, capable of conquering and holding captive forever the conscience of
these feeble rebels for their own happiness—these powers are miracle,
mystery, and authority (Dostoevsky, 1990: 253, 255).
=
Introduction
When I began research on this paper according to my original plan, I
envisioned a historical analysis of how the human conception of freedom =
in
Western civilizations was and had always been ba=
sed in
matters of faith, as provided by the example of Protestantism in
&= nbsp; After reading and studying for some time in preparation for this endeavor, what began to emerge was not at all what I had initially envision= ed. Instead, an overview of the many and varied conceptions of how people in different ages have defined freedom<= /i> surfaced and how faith, belief, and the sacrificial nature of humankind have contributed to not only the definition and conception of freedom but= the profound impact that these qualities have had on its restriction in history= .
The story of Jes=
us in
the Christian tradition in many ways ushered in the modern relationship bet=
ween
sacrifice, faith, and freedom. He died on the Cross as God’s
sacrifice so that all could be free of sin. Christians are to also have faith =
as the
result of this Great Happening and come to understand how we are ultimately
freer as the result of this Ultimate Sacrifice. What also must be acknowledged tho=
ugh,
is that religion is not only tied to our own willingness to be sacrificial,=
but
to our obligation to be obedient.
Obedience suggests not only sacrifice, but also the willing loss of
freedom. Throughout the ages,=
the
concept of freedom has taken on multiple meanings, as evidenced by o=
ur
traditional American concept of the term, but even to the levels of free=
dom
being defined as freedom from freedom (that which is dependent on
one’s political, economic, and religious perspectives), freedom as
a relative construct dependent on the culture and age in which it was found=
, to
freedom being nothing more than propaganda, a myth, or a topic worth=
y of
study by experienced students of semiotics.
What follows is =
an
overview of the relationship between sacrifice, faith, and freedo=
m
as presented by theorists, philosophers, and Western scholars since the
Enlightenment.
&=
nbsp;
Weber’s Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism (1904=
)
made clear the relationship between faith, individual freedoms, and hum=
an
motivations. According to Web=
er,
the Protestant Reformation indirectly caused the Industrial Revolution in
Western society. As the resul=
t of
Martin Luther’s break with Catholicism, a new value system was instil=
led
in early Protestants, including those not only of Lutheran origin, but among
the Calvinists and other as well.
This value system encouraged hard work (defined as fulfilling
God’s calling by Christians), clean living (to demonstr=
ate
that one must be among the saved, answering the question raised by t=
he
Calvinist concept of predestination and linked the avoidance of sin),
and frugality (the notion of avoidance of luxury and simple
living which not only contributed to resisting temptations, but lead to=
the
reinvestment of small business profit back into the fulfillment of God̵=
7;s calling,
resulting in economic growth and eventually, corporate structures and mass
production techniques). With =
the
Reformation, faith was transformed from a collective mindset toward a more =
individualistic
relationship with God, the central tenet of many Protestant faiths today.
&= nbsp; Weber was also able, in his work entitled, The Theory of Social a= nd Economic Organization (1947), to demonstrate that while employers ga= in rights over a worker’s personal freedom due to their subordinate position, such unfreedom does not necessarily extend to basic human freedoms. For instance, he concluded, echoing Rousseau, that if the state ever attempted to restrict non-human property rights, such restriction would ultimately “be comb= ined with restrictions on personal freedom, with some form of unfree labour̶= 1; (Weber, 1947: 49). As for its relationship to the Protestant Ethic, Weber stated that, “…for those involved in the fortunes of profit-making enterpris= es…[is]… significant as a proof of the individual’s own achievement or as a symbol and a means of autonomous control over the individual’s subject to his authority, or of control over economic advantages which are culturally or materially important to an indefinite plurality or persons—in a word, power” (Weber, 1947: 214).
Locke, the Two Treatises of
Government, Royalist Catholicism, and Bastiat’s The Law=
John Locke stated
that, “Adam was a King from his Creation… For whatsoever=
Locke believed t= hat by Divine Intention, all men were masters of their own existence, bound only by the will and order of God, free from domination by others, and free to do w= hat enhances one’s own posterity so long as it is within the keeping of God’s law. This view is= not altogether inconsistent with the French royalist Catholic view that God appoints Popes to govern religious matters on Earth while God appoints King= s to govern over political matters. In a strange, seemingly impossible synthesis, the two views share a common thread. The similarity natura= lly relates to the concept of faith, freedom and domination.
Two of the staun= chest critics of the French Revolution were Louis de Bonald and Joseph de Maistre. Both longed for R= 20; the ‘good-old days’ of a pre-bourgeois era…,” a feu= dal order free from both industrialism and Protestantism, based on respect and obedience to authority, whether king or Pope, in short, to God’s will= and to God’s chosen (Zeitlin, 1997: 58).= The similarity occurs with the ideas of Locke (and even Weber and Ma= rx to some degree) with the notion that the Industrial Revolution was inherent= ly evil and responsible for depriving rather than enhancing individual freedoms and allowing one to manage one’s “own posterity.” According to Bonald, in the indust= rial era, “…everything is resolved for man in society to produce in order to consume and to consume in order to produce…” (Zeitlin, 1997: 58).
…[Bonald]… derided them for seeing industry as an independent force that guarantees pe= ace and liberty, while, in fact, it was agricultural society that was in all respects superior to industrial society.&n= bsp; “The agricultural family can feed and nourish itself—it = is not dependent on other men and other social events to assure its continued existence. The industrial fam= ily, on the other hand, produces children whom it cannot be sure of supporting, dependent as it is on the vicissitudes of the market… The agricultural family respects the natural and divine order because the father is the authority, unlike the industrial system in which the father, mother, and children are isolated, and family unity is disturbed. Coupling harsh labor on children (= which prevents their education and destroys their health) with discarding the weak and the old who cannot work, the industrial revolution divides society into hostile classes and factions while agrarianism had unified it” (Zeitl= in, 1997: 58-9).
&= nbsp; Similarly, de Maistre shared this concern in his own harsh commentar= y on science. “No religion can resist science, except one” [Roman Catholicism], (Bertrin, 1910: 2) [addition mine]. One celebrated passage discussing his view of science begins:
One of the inevitable drawbacks= of science in every country, and every place, is to extinguish that love of ac= tion which is the true vocation of man; to fill him with sovereign pride, pervert him from himself and the ideas which are proper to him, to make him the ene= my of all subordination, a rebel against every law and every institution, a bo= rn champion of every innovation… (Berlin, 1990: 120-= 1).
&= nbsp; In essence, science and industry rob individuals of their freedoms rather than encourage self-reliance as is often cited as a merit of industr= ial and technological systems. Modernity invariably results in a loss of freedom, fleeting self-reliance, dependence, and the fracturing of faith, morality, family, a= nd ultimately, the cultural unwillingness to accept responsibility and practice sacrificial acts of faith. In short, modernity results in new objects of worship—material goods, wealth, and so forth, while at the same time silently and covertly reducing personal freedom. The intrica= te relationship between sacrifice, faith, and freedom is clearly evident. As Frederic Bastiat stated in his introduction and conclusion to The Law:
We hold from God the gift wh= ich includes all others. This gif= t is life—physical, intellectual, and moral life.
But life cannot maintain its= elf alone. The Creator of life has entrusted us with the responsibility of preserving, developing, and perfect= ing it. In order that we may acco= mplish this, He has provided us with a collection of marvelous faculties. And He has put us in the midst of a variety of natural resources. By the application of our faculties to these natural resources we convert them into products and use them. T= his process is necessary in order that life may run its appointed course.
Life, faculties, production—in other words, individuality, liberty, property— th= is is man. And in spite of the c= unning of artful political leaders, these three gifts from God precede all human legislation, and are superior to it.
Life, liberty, and property = do not exist because men have made laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life, liberty, and property existed beforehand that caused men to make laws in the first place… liberty is an acknowledgement of faith in God and His works (Bastiat, 1990: 5-6, 75).
Bastiat’s view is consistent with those of the founders and immigrants to America throughout = its history and is expressed in a much more contemporary manner in the 1946 fil= m, Without Reservations, which starred the famed American actor, John Wayne. Wayne’s character, a Air For= ce pilot named Rusty Thomas attempts to refute the pro-government arguments in= the book of a best-selling female author by making the following statement:
Have you ever heard of some fel= lows that first came over to this country? Do you know what they found? They found a howling wilderness, w= ith summers too hot and winters freezing. And they also found some unpleasant characters who painted their faces. Do you think these pio= neers filled out form number X277 and sent in a report saying the Indians were a little unreasonable? Did they= have insurance for their old age, for their crops, for their homes? They did not. They looked at the land and the fo= rests and the rivers, they looked at their wives, their kids, and their houses, a= nd then they looked up at the sky and they said, “Thanks God. We’ll take it from here! = 230; They were men… (Without Reservations, 1990).
de Tocqueville: Democracy in America
&= nbsp; Alexis de Tocqueville, author of Democracy in America, shared= his thoughts and perceptions with the world concerning a political and social system he truly admired. Much= of what de Tocqueville wrote concerned the union of religion and liberty in America:
The Americans combine the notio= ns of Christianity and liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossi= ble to make them conceive the one without the other; and with them this convict= ion does not spring from the barren, traditionary faith which seems to vegetate rather than to live in the soul… The philosophers of the eighteenth century explained in a very simple manner the gradual decay of religious faith. Religious zeal, said t= hey, must necessarily fail the more generally liberty is established and knowled= ge diffused. Unfortunately, the = facts by no means accord with their theory… in America, one of the freest a= nd enlightened nations in the world, the people fulfill with fervor all the outward duties of religion…In France, I had almost seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom marching in opposite directions. But in America I found they were intimately united and that they reigned in common over the same countryR= 30; (de Tocqueville, 1945: 317-19).
&=
nbsp;
In seeking to explain this phenomena, de Tocqueville offered a
comparative examination of religion in America with that found in Europe.
Man alone… displ=
ays a
natural contempt for existence, and yet a boundless desire to exist; he sco=
rns
life, but he dreads annihilation.
These different feelings incessantly urge his soul to the contemplat=
ion
of a future state, and religion directs his musings thither. Religion, then, is simply another =
form
of hope, and it is no less natural to the human heart than hope itself. Men cannot abandon their religious=
faith
without a kind of aberration of intellect and a sort of violent distortion =
of
their true nature; they are
invincibly brought back to more pious sentiments. Unbelief is an accident, and faith=
is
the only permanent state of mankind.
If we consider religious institutions merely in a human point of vie=
w,
they may be said to derive an inexhaustible element of strength from man
himself, since they belong to one of the constituent principles of human
nature.
I am aware that at certain t=
imes
religion may strengthen this influence, which originates in itself, by the
artificial power of the laws and by the support of those temporal instituti=
ons
that direct society. Religions
intimately united with the governments of the earth have been known to exer=
cise
sovereign power founded on terror and faith; but when a religion contracts an
alliance of this nature, I do not hesitate to affirm that it commits the sa=
me
error as a man who should sacrifice his future to his present welfare; and in obtaining a power to which =
it has
no claim, it risks that authority which is rightfully its own. When a religion founds its empire =
only
upon the desire of immortality that lives in every human heart, it may aspi=
re
to universal domination; but =
when
it connects itself with a government, it must adopt maxims which are applic=
able
only to certain nations. Thus=
, in
forming an alliance with a political power, religion augments its authority
over a few and forfeits the hope of reigning over all…
In America, religion is perh= aps less powerful than it has been at certain periods and among certain nations; but its influence is= more lasting. It restricts itself = to its own resources, but of these none can deprive it; its circle is limited, but it perv= ades it and holds it under undisputed control (de Tocqueville, 1945: 321, 323).<= o:p>
&= nbsp; With a bias toward his own Catholicism, de Tocqueville defended the Roman Church against the notion that it, by nature, was an anti-democratic faith. He was forced to admit though, that Protestantism was less concerned about equality among men and = more concerned with freedom and individual liberty:
I think that the Catho=
lic
religion has erroneously been regarded as the natural enemy of democracy=
230;
[it]… seems to me, on the contrary, to be one of the most favorable to
equality of condition among men..
If Catholicism predisposes the faithful to obedience, it certainly d=
oes
not prepare them for inequality;
but the contrary may be said of Protestantism, which generally tends=
to
make men independent more than to render them equal. Catholicism is like an absolute
monarchy… (de Tocqueville, 1945: 311).
In a sense, de
Tocqueville was correct. In
reviewing the works of, de Maistre, Maurras, and Marcelino Menendez-Pelayo,=
one
finds the common theme of the necessity of authority wielded by the Church =
in
order to unify, restore, and make faithful all potential followers. The rhetoric is inherently
nationalistic, restorative, and traditionally Catholic. Many scholars give credit to de Ma=
istre
as being the theoretical founder of fascism, while Pelayo is credited with
being the “lay saint of the falange” (Rock, 1993: 11).
Friederich Hayek
(1944) quoted Mussolini in his vibrant work entitled, The Road to Serfdo=
m
who said that, “We [the Italian Fascists] were the first to assert th=
at
the more complicated the forms assumed by civilization, the more restricted=
the
freedom of the individual must become” (Hayek, 1994: 49). Many never consider the
implications of freedom and security as incompatible according to Hayek.
Where distinction and =
rank
are achieved almost exclusively by becoming a salaried servant of the state,
where to do one’s assigned duty is regarded as more laudable than to
choose one’s own field of usefulness, where all pursuits that do not =
give
a recognized place in the official hierarchy or a claim to a fixed income a=
re
regarded as inferior and even somewhat disreputable, it is too much to expe=
ct
that many will long prefer freedom to security… Once things have gone=
too
far, liberty indeed becomes almost a mockery, since it can be purchased onl=
y by
the sacrifice of most of the good things of this earth. In this state it is little surpris=
ing
that more and more people should come to feel that without economic security
liberty is “not worth having” and that they are willing to
sacrifice their liberty for security (Hayek, 1994: 145-6).
Of course, one&#=
8217;s
freedoms include those religious freedoms of which sacrifice =
is
paramount. As Benjamin Frankl=
in
stated, “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a litt=
le
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”
Whereas in Ameri=
ca
religion has constitutionally been granted a position separate from the sta=
te,
Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Franklin, and others intended that our collective
efforts be matters of faith and basic state security while all other endeav=
ors
be geared toward individualism, liberty, innovation, competition, and succe=
ss:
“The government that governs least, governs best.” In keeping with this notion,=
there
is a good deal of truth, according to Hayek, in Reinhold Niebuhr’s bo=
ok
entitled, Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932), in which he says the=
re
is “an increasing tendency among modern men to imagine themselves eth=
ical
because they have delegated their vices to larger and larger
groups.” Hayek explains=
:
To act on behalf of a =
group
seems to free people of many of the moral restraints which control their be=
havior
as individuals within the group… It is therefore no accident thatR=
30;
most planners are militant nationalists… the separation of economic a=
nd
political aims is an essential guaranty of individual freedom and… it=
is
consequently attacked by all collectivists… What is called economic
power, while it can be an instrument of coercion, is, in the hands of priva=
te
individuals, never exclusive or complete power, never power over the whole =
life
of a person. But centralized =
as an
instrument of political power, it creates a degree of dependence scarcely
distinguishable from slavery (Hayek, 1994: 159-61).
&= nbsp; Echoing thoughts from de Tocqueville, Bastiat, and even Bonald, Hayek concluded that the collective use of power in a political form is inherently socialistic, nationalist, and anti-religious. Even private economic power direct= ed into the political sphere can steer social policy and create dependence for various groups of people who must sacrifice their liberties for the provided security, and among those sacrifices, religion and morality are often included. The socially-consci= ous philanthropic wealthy, the media, the social and political idealists, and t= he social engineers and planners naturally fall on the side of social justice = and security rather than on the side of individual liberty, property rights, rewarded success, and religious faith.
An observation w=
as
once made by philosopher-scholar Emile Cioran while reading Johannes
Eckhart’s Sermons.
Cioran read that suffering is intolerable to one who suffers for
himself, but is light to one who suffers for God, because it is God who bea=
rs
the burden, though it be heavy with the suffering of all mankind. He commented that he could underst=
and
such a phrase “for it perfectly applies to one who can never relieve
himself of all that weighs upon him” (Cioran, 1992: 11-2). Thus, the sacrificial element of f=
aith
is exposed. When one acknowle=
dges
the compatibility of faith and sacrifice, individual freedom, albeit alonen=
ess
at times, may be preserved without the collective intrusion of the state or
other entity who may provide security or needs while depriving one of freed=
om
and liberty. Cioran also
brought to light one of the most notable phrases from de Maistre (from his =
Considerations)
explaining the difference in Christianity and bondage, and one that
demonstrates the believer’s tolerance, acceptance, and promotion of
religious principles:
&nb= sp;
The final words =
on
sacrifice, faith and freedom comes from the historical, philosophical, and =
even
prophetic vision of German historian Oswald Spengler, as extracted from his=
Decline
of the West. Spengler
proclaimed:
Only the timeless is t=
rue… truths lie bey=
ond
history and life, and vice versa life is something beyond all causes, effec=
ts,
and truths… Religious knowledge, too, is power—man is not only
ascertaining causations, but handling them. He who knows the secret relationsh=
ip
between microcosm and macrocosm commands it also, whether the knowledge has
come to him from worship or by eavesdropping… he compels the deity
through sacrifice and prayer; he practices the true rites and sacraments
because they are causes of inevitable results, and whoever knows them, him =
they
must serve. He reads in the s=
tars
and in the sacred books; in his power lies, timeless and immune from all
accident, the causal relation of sin and propitiation, repentance and
absolutions, sacrifice and grace… we can understand the ultimate mean=
ing
of religious ethics—Moral… Moral is a conscious a=
nd
planned causality of the conduct, apart from all particulars of actual life=
and
character, something eternal and universally valid, not only without time, =
but
hostile to time and for that very reason true. Even if mankind did not exist, =
moral
would be true and valid… (Spengler, Vol.2, 1928: 171-2).
What Spengler su=
ggests
here is that the religious nature, composed of truths and moralit=
y (which
are one and the same) is power.&nbs=
p;
Power can also be defined as freedom, can it not? Notice also that Spengler states t=
hat moral,
“apart from all particulars of actual life and character” i=
s true. Thus, we may conclude that that wh=
ich
interferes with the practice of faith is a vexation to the Spirit and in
essence, false. He
continues:
… it was creative
enthusiasm in the man of the city that from the tenth century B.C. drew
generation after generation under the spell of a new life, with which emerg=
ed
for the first time in human history the idea of freedom… the
freedom-idea [for]ever contains a negative… it loses, redeems, defend=
s,
always frees a man from something… [All] intellectual, social,=
and
national movements [that burst forth]…under the name of Freedom leads
back to an origin… (Spengler, 1928: 354) [additions mine].
And, in conclusi=
on,
There is no natu=
ral
science without a precedent religion… even atheistic science has religion; mod=
ern
mechanics exactly reproduces the contemplativeness of Faith…
There is no justificat=
ion of
assigning to this intellectual form-world [the natural sciences] the primacy
over others. Every critical
science, like every myth and every religious belief, rests upon an inner
certitude. Various as the cre=
atures
of this certitude may be, both in structure and in sound, they are not
different in basic principle. Any
reproach, therefore, leveled by Natural science at Religion is a boomerang =
[Emphasis
mine]. We are presumptuous an=
d no
less in supposing that we can ever set up “The Truth” in the pl=
ace
of “anthropomorphic” conceptions, for no other conceptions but
these exist at all. Every =
idea
that is possible at all is a mirror of the being of its author [Emphasis
mine]… Each Culture has made its own set of images of processes, which
are true only for itself and only alive while it is itself alive and
actualizing its possibilities. When
a Culture is at its end and the creative element—the imaginative powe=
r,
the symbolism—is extinct, there are left “empty” formulae,
skeletons of dead systems, which men of another culture read literally, fee=
l to
be without meaning or value and either mechanically store up or else despise
and forget… (Spengler, Vol. 1,
1926: 381-2).
Bastiat,
Frederic. The Law. Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The
Foundation for Economic
Education, 1990.=
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Isaiah. “Joseph de Mais=
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and the Origin of Fascism.” The Crooked Timber of
Humanity. Princeton: Princeton University Pr=
ess,
1990.
Bertrin,
George. “Joseph-Marie, =
Comte
de Maistre.” The Catholic Encyclopedia, 1910
ed. http://www.newadvent.or=
g/cathen/09554a.htm
Cioran,
E. M. “Joseph de Maistr=
e: An
Essay on Reactionary Thought.”
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span
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y,
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Volokhonsky. New=
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