Dini= ng With the Devil at Disney World: The Unique Secularization of American Evangelical Churches

Walter H. Scalen, Jr.

J. B. Watson, Jr= .

Angelina = = College/<= o:p>

Stephen = = F. = = Austin = = State = = University<= o:p>

= &nb= sp; =

Fina= lly! A user-friendly church designed to= meet the needs of today’s people, and their lifestyles. McChurch, a place where God has diversified his investment portfolio offering everyon= e a choice from our many various ministries: “Extreme Makeover by God.” Beginners class 2= shows everyone the new you! Come ea= rly and enjoy breakfast with our associate pastor and world renown chef in the = character of ‘El= vis Priestly’ as he presents Biblical truths during a ‘pe= rsonal, made to order’ spiritual meal deal in “Jesus the Rock, and the Low Carb Roll= 221; (Speegle, 2005:1).

Introduc= tion

It has been said that imitation is the highest = form of flattery. In the case of culture, it is a prescription for extinction. W= hen the people of one culture begin to imitate the way of life of another group, they are disavowing their past and assuming a new identity. They may soon f= ind themselves transformed into a new reality. In the case of many American evangelical churches, the corporate business culture has an intoxicating appeal. Over the last decade, the influence of the so-called Church Growth Movement (CGM) has accelerated the McDonaldization of numerous churches. In some ca= ses, the process has occurred in a literal fashion; several Houston, Texas<= /st1:State> area congregations have McDonald’s resta= urants built into their facilities, complete with drive-through windows. Food cour= ts, bookstores, cafes, boutiques, and even banks are now part of the worship experience. These developments, however, are only the byproduct of a fundamental paradigm shift, which includes churches restructuring themselves according to a corporate business model. The social factors driving the “modernization” and unique secularization of some of America’s most conservative churches will be the= focus of our paper. We will explore the history, methods, and outcomes of this sociological trend, and its implications for the society at large. Several limitations of our analysis should be noted. We recognize= that there is some variation in the ideas of CGM advocates; our generalizations = in this paper are thus limited. = In addition, we recognize that evangelical religious groups are diverse in doctrine and history. In making generalizations (about evangelical churches= ), we recognize that our conclusions may not apply to all cases.

As one of the co-authors was sitting alone havi= ng lunch not too long ago, he overheard the conversation of two local pastors = in the region where he lives. In their thirty-minute conversation, they discus= sed capital projects, fundraising techniques, market targets, demographic profi= les, accounting procedures, training modules, mission statements, and so on. Had one of the co-authors not known their professional identities, he might have assumed that they were business leaders, perhaps corporate executives, or maybe business trainers or consultants. By no means are = we suggesting that an isolated conversation is proof positive that evangelical churches have universally embraced American business culture. It is, however, a small example of= a powerful and far-reaching paradigm shift presently occurring in many evangelical churches. The evidence (for this movement) is very observable b= oth inside and outside of evangelical churches. The leaders of this movement have = served as “spiritual advisors” to the last two American Presidents; Bi= ll Hybels, pastor of Willow Creek Church in suburban Chi= cago was a key advisor to Bill Clinton, and, currently, Rick Warren, pastor of Saddleback Community Church in California is reportedly in a similar positi= on with George W. Bush.

One of the co-authors has spent considerable ti= me in two churches that have undergone the transition advocated by Hybels, Warren, and others. In one case, the shift was gradual, and in the other, it was radical and traumatic. Interestingly, in = both cases, the rank and file members seemed to have little understanding about = what was happening. In one case, n= ot even the governing board members were involved in the decision to change the church’s focus. In both cases, many of the changes appeared to be cosmetic - a plastic pulpit, an abundance of silk plants, a church “logo,” trained greeters, a hospitality booth, a coffee bar, the introduction of Power Point in sermons, and so on. Then came the building program. Consultants were brought in to help with fundraising.= The architecture of the proposed buildings was notably “modern.” Gone were pews, stained glass, songbooks, and Christian symbols. The buildings were “mall-like,” with a notable focus on = the stage area. Theatrical lighting, video screens, and other performance-orien= ted elements were added.

During this period, a distinctive rhetoric emer= ged. Humorously and redundantly, the same phrases were used at both churches. “We must reach a new generation,” we were told. “The meth= ods must change, but the message never will” was another frequently heard mantra. Some of the sermons d= uring the fund-raising phase were virtually identical in both churches. There was= a renewed emphasis on outreach and growth, but “getting big” beca= me an obsession. The most stunni= ng of all shifts was a virtual revolution in music. The classic hymns and a few praise choruses were replaced with a much harder-edged, upbeat, rock style = of music, and, predictably the volume was raised. In one church, the volume was regu= larly over 100 decibels, which incidentally exceeds the limit set for NBA arenas. Sermons also changed; distinguishing between sermons and motivational speeches became increasingly difficult. On one occasion an= d in utter amazement, one of the co-authors listened to an Easter sermon entitle= d, “How to Deal with Resentment,” which was something many individ= uals may have been dealing with immediately after the sermon was over.

A Brief = History of the Church Growth Movement (CGM)

Comprehensive treatments of the history of CGM = are available elsewhere (e.g., McIntosh and Engle, 2004). We will provide only a few cursory comments on the movement’s history.&= nbsp; Recently, one of the co-authors invited one the local proponents of = the Church Growth Movement to speak to a “Religion and Society” class. The speaker, a leader = of an association of regional churches affiliated with a large evangelical denomination, indicated that the roots of the modern CGM could be found in = the work and writings of a missionary named Donald McGavar= an. In 1955, McGavaran published a book entitled, <= i>The Bridges of God in which he introd= uced his concept of cultural “contextualism= 221; (McGavaran, 1955).&nb= sp; He noted that church buildings planted in Africa by foreign missionaries were fashioned to look like the style of the culture where they were from and not like the architecture of the local peoples. For McGavaran (1955), such practices presented a problem for the advancement of missionary work. He proposed that some measure of local cultural accommodation should become part of the missionary effort in order to better connect with target populations. He also emphasized practicality, reporting numbers, and develo= ping other indicators of active involvement in church activities as a sign of discipleship. In 1965, McGavaran was invited to Fuller Theological Seminary = in Pasadena, California to establish the School of World Missions. In 1970, McGavaran and Peter Wagner wrote Understanding Church Growth, a classic in = the CGM literature, as reflected in its numerous revised editions. According to the presenter in the Sociology of Religion class, the modern CGM has its roots in McGavaran’s teaching. He recommended, however, Rick Warren’s Purpose-Driven Church= (1995) as a cur= rent and “popularized” version of key CGM ideas.

Basic Te= nets of the Church Growth Movement (CGM)

The proponents of the CGM such as Rick Warren, = Bill Hybels, sociologist- demographer George Barna, consultant and motivational speaker John Maxwell, business guru Peter Drucker, among others, are intelligent, articulate, a= nd persuasive individuals who have made a convincing case for their ideas. Regardless of ones’ theological ilk, it would be difficult to disagree with an emphasis on outreach and growth. Who would reject the notion that churches should be well managed and pursue organizational excellence? It is easy to make the case against dreary traditionalism, and who would not want to embrace invigorating new innovations? However, one should always reserve the right to ask questions.=

The “Seeker-Sensitive” or “Purpose-Driven” system is based on the concept of “contextualization,” which means that meticulous attention should be paid to the cultural context of each situation. Ironically, CGM advocates propose a “cookie-cutter” formula that is thoroughly stereotypical. Individuals who have ever attended more than one “purpose-driven̶= 1; church quickly recognize that they are remarkably similar in nature. Church attendees often note a “standard issue” coffee bar, a plastic pulpit, a corporate-like logo, drama teams, contemporary music (often the same songs), and the ever-present silk plants. Other common ingredients include participation in “The Forty Days of Purpose,” frequent references to the Prayer of Jabez (Wilkinson, 2000), the repetitive use of the word, “cool,” and a virtual obsession with Cappuccino. Instead of “local flavor” in the neighborhood evangelical church, one is increasingly more likely to find a “McDonalds-likeR= 21; uniformity.

When churches build food courts, coffee bars, bookstores, and boutiques into their sanctuaries (a term that is rarely use= d in evangelical circles), and do it under the privilege of a “non-profit” status and enjoy property tax exemptions, are they operating as churches or quasi-business enterprises? Cynics might argue that religious organizations have always had a “dirty little secret” - money a= nd numbers both count as indicators of success in the church context (Guinness, 1993). The business mindset, however, of many new-paradigm churches takes this notion to a new level. Critics of the CGM often suggest t= hat it is difficult not to recall “Jesus driving the moneychangers out of the temple,” or the early church reformers confronting the marketing of religious artifacts and the sale of indulgences. Did the Christian Martyrs die for = food courts, coffee bars, and “Christian” golf courses? Did Jesus come that we might have capitalism?

There was a time in the history of religion in = America when Catholics, Protestants, and other religio= us groups were focused on building schools, orphanages, hospitals, and meeting= the needs of immigrants (Olasky, 1995). Many church leaders were driven by= what they perceived as “just” causes, such as the abolition of slave= ry and prison reform. The focus of churches drawn into the CGM seems to be “reaching the culture by becoming the culture.”   Notions about a culture of service, healing, and redemption are relegated to a secondary position. In his book, Rethinking the Wineskin; The Practice of the New Testament = Church (1998), Theology Professor Frank Vio= la states:

The “supermall” church bears too striki= ng a resemblance to the shallow business structures of this age to have any prof= ound or lasting impact on the culture. Put plainly, the modern techniques it utilizes to communicate the go= spel are often just as carnal as the system from which it is supposed to deliver people. In this way, the gospel has become trivialized, commercialized, and emptied of its power, being viewed as just another “product” in= our consumer-obsessed culture (Viola, 1998: 53).

Viola is not alone in his views. While CGM advo= cates have made a systematic effort to market their ideas, some evangelical leade= rs remain unconvinced. Championi= ng the idea of near unanimity, CGM leader, Rick Warren, in his book, The Purpose-Driven<= span style=3D'font-family:Arial'> Church= , includes a list of those who supposedly endor= se his ideas. It reads like a virtual “Who’s Who” of U.S.<= span style=3D'font-family:Arial'> evangelical leaders.   In his “Church Growth Seminars for Pastors,” Warren reportedly pokes fun at the “fifties church” mentality.

Critics of the Church Growth Movement (CGM)

Both John MacArthur= and Greg Laurie are pastors of 10,000 + congregations in California. Neither are apparent fans of CGM ideas. Laurie wrote th= e Upside Down Church= (1999), in which he documents how his church grew by violating almost every CGM formula. MacArthur pulls no punches in his Ash= amed of the Gospel: When the Church Becomes like the World (1993), and is equally hard-hitting in his new book, Hard to Believe: The High Cost and Infinite Value of Following Jesus (2003). In his 1993 book, Dining Wi= th The Devil: The Megachurch Movement Flirts With Modernity, philosopher-theologian Os Guinness was one of the first to p= oint out CGM’s use of business management, marketing, and psychological techniques to “grow” churches, and identified a number of negative consequences of the movement. This brillian= tly thoughtful and analytical work has proven to be “prophetic,” but was largely ignored at the time. Other notable CGM critics include Jim Cymbala, pastor of Brooklyn Tabernacle and author of Fresh Wind, Fresh Fire (= 2003), and theologian David Wells, the author of such books as No Place For Tru= th: Or Whatever Happened to Evangelical Theology (1993). Leaders of Reformed and Lutheran churches are frequent critics of CGM approaches. Furthermore, if you = type the phrases, “seeker-sensitive,” “purpose-driven,” = or “Church Growth Movement” into any Internet search engine one wi= ll easily encounter a “plethora” of articles on this subject. Even secular observers have expres= sed concern about the commercialization of evangelical churches. In the September 2002 issue of = GQ Magazine, author Walter Kirn wrote a scathi= ng yet candid article, entitled, “What Would Jesus Do?” He noted the emergence of a modern= Christian subculture, which he calls a “bad Xerox of the mainstream, not a truly distinctive achievement.” He goes on to say that “what makes th= is stuff so half-assed, so thin, so weak, and cumulatively so demoralizing is = that it has nothing to do with faith…the problem is the lack of faith.”   He conclu= des, “…without the courage to lead, it numbly follows, picking up the major media’s scraps and gluing them back together with a cross on top” (Kirn, 2002:9-10).=

Alternative Models of Church Growth

A number of counter-movements to CGM, based on = other assumptions of other effective organizational strategies for churches, are present in the evangelical subculture.&nbs= p; Only a cursory discussion of these alternative strategies will be discussed here.   There a= re a number of other contrarian responses to CGM not mentio= ned this discussion. A thorough discussion of perspectives on church growth can be found in a recent book, = Evaluating The Church Grow= th Movement: 5 Views (McIntosh and Engl= e, 2004).   All of th= ese emerging schools of thought are much larger than simply a response to the C= GM, and (in some cases) have a long history.&n= bsp; The cell church movement, which is sometimes referred to also as the home church movement, advocates a model of grassroots involvement, “p= lanting” churches in local communities with a very informal structure, limited staff, and little “bricks and mortar.” Advocates of this model argue that= it is much closer to the “New Testament church” than current megachurches. = A more recent emphasis, which could be termed the “small groups” movement, is associated with the writings of Russ Robinson and Bill Donahue; their most recent book is The Seven Deadly S= ins of Small Group Ministry (2002). This movement recognizes a fundamen= tal truth of Social Psychology: individuals experiences religion at the small-group level. “Small groups” adheren= ts propose a number of deliberative strategies, applicable in both small churc= hes and megachurches.

A third countermovement, associated with the wr= itings of Richard Foster and USC Philosophy Professor Dallas Willard, is the Renovare movement.&n= bsp; Renovare leaders emphasize the neglect o= f the concept of “spiritual formation” in the local church, and call = for a return to ”five great Christian traditions” - contemplative, = holiness, charismatic (spirit-empowered), social justice, and evangelical. The Renovare<= /span> Spiritual Formation Bible is due for release in June 2005; it will include classic devotional readings from earlier generations of church leaders and theologians (e.g., John of the Cross, Augustine, Martin Luther, and Merton). A fourth movement, d= ubbed here as the “spiritual capital” movement, involves the renewal = of the traditional community mission of local churches. As churches work to meet the needs= of local communities, they develop “spiritual” capital, formed thr= ough the personal growth of church members, local residents and the new networks developed in the local community. Some observers see the growth of faith-based organizations, increasi= ngly working in partnership with evangelical churches, as pivotal in this “creating spiritual capital” approach, and allowing churches to experience growth in a grassroots fashion (Wuthnow, 2004).

The Chur= ch Growth Movement (CGM) and Secularization Theory

Many churches and religious organizations posit= ion themselves as “the last great hope” to resist secularization, arguing that they are the only “remnant” capable of maintaining traditional church doctrines and practices (McGuire, 2002). In contrast, adherents of the CGM = openly embrace a unique form of secularization, welcomed by church leaders as the = formula for short-term and long-term success. Sociologist Alan Wolfe, in his rec= ent book, The Transformation of American Religion: How We Actually Live Our Faith (2003), suggests that modern church’s intoxication with corporate business culture, psychology, and pop culture is part of a larger trend, secularization. Secularization, as defined by sociologists, is the process by which religion in a society begins to lose influence; the interest in other worldly or idealistic religious ideas is replaced with greater emphasis on material success and other “practical” concerns. According to sociologist Will Herberg= , America is “at once the most religio= us and the most secular of nations” (1983:41).   Wolfe puts it another way: “In every aspect of the religious life, American faith has met Americ= an culture - and American culture has triumphed” (2003:3). He goes on to say that “the faithful in the United States<= span style=3D'font-family:Arial;color:black'> are remarkably like everyone else (2003:3).” In other words, modern evangelical churches in <= st1:country-region>America have “succeeded by failing.” Wolfe defends his position by citi= ng a significant number of quantitative and qualitative studies of contemporary American religion. What is es= pecially interesting is that it is not only evangelical Protestantism that is underg= oing transformation; Catholic, Mormon, Jewish, and Moslem groups are feeling the pressure to modernize in order to appeal to prospective members. In all of these religious communit= ies there is evidence that an emphasis on the teaching of doctrine is disappear= ing, pop culture is being imitated, and codes of personal morality are being rev= ised (Wolfe, 2003).

Traditional secularization theories assert that social structures once infused with religious signific= ance are increasingly transformed into secular entities, and religious instituti= ons lose their power to influence both the individual behavior of citizens and = the larger culture. Until the 198= 0s, this view of secularization dominated the Sociology of Religion (Christiano, Swatos and Kivisto, 2002). Traditional secularization theories now compete, however, with a “new paradigm,&#= 8221; which holds that societies with no state church or predominant religion enj= oy greater religious participation than those with government sponsored monopo= ly faiths. According to the new paradigm, when political and ecclesiastical institutions are separated, peo= ple become more involved in religion (Warner 1993; Finke and Stark 1992).<= /o:p>

New paradigm advocates poi= nt to the Second Great Awakening, a period of intense religious revival after the Revolutionary War, to buttress their claim that the separation of church and state increases religious activity (Warner, 1993; Finke and Stark 1992). Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, two = new paradigm theorists, claim that the Second Great Awakening was caused by competition between churches after state-supported Protestant establishments were dismantled. According to= Finke and Stark, “de= regulated&#= 8221; religion in the early republic actually signaled the first free and open &#= 8220;religious market,” whereby various religious entrepreneurs vied for adherents.   Consequeently, this free-mar= ket model of religious predated the modern era.   In early American history, religious freedom ensured that itinerant preachers and religious innovators would have opportunity to establish new congregations (or orchestrate theological schisms) without governmental interference (Finke, 1990). This phenomena allowed citizens to choose from a wide variety of churches, and affiliate with one that met their interests. Pastors were also compelled to “meet their parishioners needs,” since member contributions were their principal livelihood, and dissatisfied adherents were free to leave (Finke and Stark, 2000). In short, Finke and Stark asserted that religious entrepeneurship generated vigorous competition among churches in every regi= on of the country. This competition increased the efficiency of religious organizations, and increased rates of individual religious participation. Finke and Stark’s = (2000) model is the most prominent new paradigm theory, but many advocates of traditional secularization theory remain (Bruce, 2002; Wolfe, 2003).

Our analysis of the modern= CGM suggests that the secularization thesis should perhaps be focused more precisely on the identification of “threads of secularization.” The wide variability in religious = change across societies suggests that there is a need for some conceptual refineme= nt regarding a “monolithic” secularization process. Perhaps secularization of modern religious organizations and churches is uneven, cyclical and sector-specifi= c: particular social forces come together to generate change in specific relig= ious sectors (e.g., the CGM in evangelical churches).   Our analysis of the CGM, how= ever, is consistent with a more general view of the pervasive impact of the secularization process. As Alan Wolfe (2003) argued, the vast majority (though not all) of American religion - Western, Eastern, Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, Christian, Catholic, Protestant, Pentecostal, denominational, sectarian, and New Age - reflect accommodation to many of the domin= ant values, attitudes, and behaviors that characterize American secular life.

The classic work of sociol= ogist Peter Berger on secularization has particular relevance to a theoretical context for the CGM. Accordin= g to Berger’s highly influential theory of secularization (Berger,1967), with the emergen= ce of the modern world, religious organizations were compelled to adapt to two= new environmental “realities.” First, the growth of individualism= has made religion “a matter of choice; religious orientations no longer reflect the legitimating requirements of society so much as the preferences= of individuals or of nuclear families. Religion has undergone ‘privatization’ “ (Berger,1967:133-135). I= n the modern world, as Berger further notes, “re= ligion manifests itself as public rhetoric and private virtue. In other words, in = so far as religion is common it lacks ‘reality,’ a= nd in so far as it is ‘real= ’ i= t lacks commonality” (1967:134). Secondly, religions must also cope= with the new reality of “pluralism” (= Berger, 1967). The “religious monopolies” of the past are gone and unlikely to return, at least und= er the highly differentiated conditions of advanced capitalism (Stark, 2000).<= o:p>

The two processes of privatization and pluralism have occurred hand in hand, and by the late twentieth century, religious allegiances have become essentially voluntary,= and a highly competitive market for these allegiances has emerged. In Berger’s = words this means that religious traditions, “wh= ich previously could be authoritatively imposed, now [have] to be marketed. [Th= ey] must be ‘sold&#= 8217; to a clientele that is no longer constrained to ‘bu= y&#= 8217; “ (Berger, 1967:138).   Religious institutions have = become marketing agencies, and ona quest for new marketing strategies. Long-standi= ng religious traditions quickly and routinely become consumer commodities.

This fundamental shift in = the basic social circumstances of religious organizations leads to far-reaching consequences for the both the structure and the belief sytems of contempora= ry religions. In order to compet= e in the new religious market place, religious organizations , especially church= es, must rationalize their efforts. Like the other “institutions of modernity,” religious organizations have become increasingly bureaucratic and business-like. An unanticipated consequence of th= is bureaucratization is that religious groups have become ever more similar in form and functioning, and subject to extra-religious criteria of efficiency. In such market conditions, products may be subject to standardization. With the primacy of the consumer, Berger’s analysis sugge= sts that each organization tries to fashion a product that similarly meets the = same consumer preferences. Competi= tive edge is maintained through the development and preservation of marginal differences in style and approach, while minimizing any real differences in substance. Likewise, in matte= rs of substance and style, the product must conform to the dictates of its new institutional context - the private sphere. Religious activities that place a priority on satisfying the needs characteristic of private life (e.g., entertainment, quality inexpeensive child care, marital support, childrearing, and quality recreational activities) gain a competitive advantage. Moreover, some religious groups religions may offer a product “consonant with the secula= rized consciousness” of inhabitants of advanc= ed industrial societies. In the pluralistic competition of many look-alike religious groups, Berger pessimistically points out that the plausibility of all religious groups ma= y be undermined, as the content of each is relativized. Religious beliefs “ar= e &#= 8216;de-objectivated,&#= 8217; that is, deprived of their status as taken-for-granted, objective reality&#= 8221; (Berger 1967:151). In this cu= ltural context, the veracity of religious claims becomes a matter of subjective consciousness and conviction alone.

In conclusion, Berger proposed two options in regard to religions in the modern world:

They can either accommodate themselves to the situation, play the pluralistic game of religious free enterprise, and come to terms as best they can with the plausibility proble= m by modifying their product in accordance with consumer demands. Or they can re= fuse to accommodate themselves, entrench themselves behind whatever socio-religi= ous structures they can maintain or construct, and continue to profess the old objectivities as much as possible as if nothing had happened (1967:53).

In light of this conceptual analysis, CGM is a predictable outcome of contemporary social forces impinging on evangelical churches.   The CGM, then, is largely the product of a modern societal system, where an emphasis on rationality is openly embraced by evangelical church leaders. Churches alter their traditional institutional ethos of opposition to “worldly ideas” to accommodate the new “modern” system, so they can comptete in the “religious marketplace.”

Conclusions and Implications
Our analysis of the church growth movement suggests a number of research questi= ons for sociologists of religion. An obvious question relates to the stability of and momentum of the CGM. On its 50^th anniversary= , will it continue to be the dominant school of thought on church growth in the evangelical context? The development of hybrid models, linking both CGM ideas and more traditional ideas, such as those espoused by the Renovare movement or the small groups movement, may become more common. Will alterna= tive models of church growth follow the same path to legitimation as the CGM? Will emerging<= /span> schools of thought on church growth be co-opted by the dominant CGM model in order to achieve some recognition? &n= bsp; Will CGM churches eventually become disillusioned with the internal “cookie cutter” culture, and return to more traditional roots (e.g., greater emphasis on teaching doctrine)?   As sociologist Allan Johnson= once wrote, religion either defines a culture or ref= lects it (Johnson, 1986).

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