Group Selection = and Christian Agape

J. Jeffrey Tillman

= Wa= yland Ba= ptist Un= iversity

&= nbsp; Human altruism remains an interesting mystery.&n= bsp; In spite of Western egoistic economics, politics, and religion, altr= uism persists as an ideal and a practice. During the last thirty years, sociobiology and evolutionary psycholo= gy have suggested that human altruism can be explained just as it can in natur= e, as a type of survival strategy. This provides an interesting perspective on why a form of Christian altruism, sacrificial agape, has come to be interpreted differently in the = last 60 years. <= /p>

Sociobiological Background

&= nbsp; In animals and insects two types of altruism are commonly noted. Kinship altruism describes the beh= avior of virtually all birds and mammals who will place themselves in danger in o= rder to protect their young (Hamilton, 1964). Reciprocal altruism re= fers to the helping behaviors of some higher mammals such as bats, apes, and elephants. These animals assi= st others even when they are genetically unrelated, ostensibly because they receive similar treatment from the parties they assist (Trivers, 1971).

&= nbsp; As with much of biological and social theory, these types of altruism are cast= in individualistic terms, and they are said to operate in terms of the fitness= of the genes of individuals. If = these genes prove to be part of a successful individual package of survival, then that organism passes its genes along to offspring who perhaps flourish. This individualistic version of evolutionary thought has been dominant for over 100 years, and group select= ion has received little attention. The use of group selection by Social Darwinism led to the disrepute of both when the flaws of Social Darwinism became evident, and an ensuing rift between t= he natural and social sciences construed human social groups as operating according to patterns different from those in nature (Dawson, 1999). In the last thirty years, however,= a broader view called multi-level selection has emerged. It recognizes the relevance of both individual and group selection, with a specific category of “between group” selection addressing the maximization of fitness of a particul= ar group in reference to other groups. (Wilson & Sober, 1994, Wilson, 1997 & Field, 1998).

&= nbsp; In regard to altruism, group selection investigates whether self-giving behavi= or traits increase the fitness of one group relative to another. For researchers operating out of an individualistic perspective, such expectations appear to be unrealistic. Why would an individual increase h= is or her fitness for the sake of the larger group (McAndrew, 2002 & Wilson, 1997)? What has become more apparent both theoretically and in observation, however, is that natural and human communities dominated by altruists are more fit in competitions with non-altruistic communities (Wilson, 1997 & Gintis, 2003). Research on the protective habits = of guppies illustrates one pattern. When a school of guppies in the wild becomes aware of a potential threat, select individuals within the school proceed toward the threat to ascertain its danger. If they survive the approach, then they report back to the school the results of th= eir scouting foray. The mortality= rate for scouts is much higher than the mortality rate for a non-scout within the school, but the willingness of some members to be scouts increases the surv= ival rate of the whole school. Such behavior is not adaptive for individual scouts, but it is for the whole gro= up (Dugatkin, 1999).

&= nbsp; The extent to which this kind of example applies to humans is questioned. Bioligists often speak as though a= nimal behavior and human behavior are a seamless unity. Specifically, animals are implied = as having intentions. While there is interesting work ongoing to investigate whether animals have somet= hing like human consciousness, emotion, and motivation (Griffin, 2004) and while most biologists will admit that references to animal intentions are largely metaphorical, one must remember that on the whole kinship and reciprocal patterns in animals are better described as hardwired behaviors that have evolved to benefit the survival of individuals. Forces of natural selection constr= ucted the behavior not the organisms themselves.= Referring to animals as altruists seems odd, then, because they lack= the critical component of a traditional definition of human altruism and that i= s an intention to do good for another (Tesser, 1995).

But even once human motivation is included in t= he mix, the nature of that motivation is at issue. The powerful influence of self-int= erest in Western political and social theory has not left biology and sociobiology untouched. For example, kinsh= ip and reciprocal altruism when applied to humans are frequently seen as other directed but selfish in motivation. The underlying reason for the behavior is to help one’s offspr= ing or to have the favor returned in the future. While this individual perspective resonates with a large section of contemporary political and economic theor= y, it has a difficult time explaining the abundant examples of human behavior which follow the pattern of selflessness for others (Gintis, 2003 & Feh= r, 2003), and it is quite different from the traditional notion of altruism as self-sacrifice for another without regard for reward or the effect on onese= lf (Monroe, 1990).

Memes for Cooperation<= /span>

&= nbsp; Human social culture complicates scientific investigation further. In non-human communities, the preservation of behavior patterns from generation to generation is generally accomplished by genetic transmission. Among humans, behaviors are transmitted by the teaching and modeling= of particular cultural behavior patterns.&nbs= p; Some sociobiologists call these units of cultural inheritance “memes,” a name both phonetically and semantically related to “gene.” Mem= es operate according to essentially the same principles of selection as genes,= and a community built upon a collection of memes commanding greater devotion fr= om its members than a rival memetic community does from its members is more li= kely to survive (Blackmore, 1999, & Dawson, 1999).

&= nbsp; Memes for cooperation are vital components to the success of any community. Without individuals being willing = to contribute to the goals of the group, the community dies. A particular problem is with non-cooperators or free-riders, who enjoy all the benefits of association w= ith the group but avoid the costs of cooperation. Two types of counter measures are important. First, the communi= ty must work diligently to internalize its memes within its members. Habits advocating self-sacrifice f= or the sake of the group are admonished through rituals, teaching, and modeling and ideally become second nature to the members (Gintis, Solving, 2003, & Field, 1998). When successful= ly inculcated, these habits can drive individuals to great personal sacrifice, such as the marine private who in one motion sees the live grenade tossed i= nto his foxhole and leaps to cover it, saving the other members of his squad. Or, it can result in behaviors so automatic that they are practiced beyond the original community, for exampl= e, the woman who leaves a tip for a waiter in a foreign country she never expe= cts to visit again. Second, those who fail to cooperate are identified and then removed or reintegrated (Dawson, 1999; and Mealey, Daood, & Krage, 1996= ). This can be accomplished by punish= ment, which itself has altruistic dimensions.&nb= sp; Punishment requires a willing punisher who expends energy and resour= ces for which he or she will likely never be repaid but which will benefit the = group as a whole if the non-cooperator leaves the group or is reintegrated into it (Fehr & Gachter, 2002). C= ostly signaling is another means. Extravagant and personally costly ceremonies or behaviors are made c= ompulsory to membership. Those who have= a superficial connection to the community or wish to enjoy the benefits of membership without the obligations will be unwilling to undertake these practices and must separate themselves from the community (McAndrew, 81). Because the required behavior is p= ublic, fewer altruistic punishers are needed to monitor the group membership and t= hose individuals’efforts can be channeled toward more direct group goals (Sosis, 2000).

Sacrificial Agape as a Christian = Meme

&= nbsp; In sociobiological terms, Christianity is a community which replicates the mem= es found in the Christian canon ( Pyper, 77). The survival of these memes depends on how faithfully the community is replicated along the established pattern and how well it convinces members in each generation to adopt and advance its beliefs.

Altruism has a long history as a memetic tradit= ion within Christianity under the category of Christian love, or more specifica= lly the Greek term agape. The Christian canon contains all t= he forms of altruism commonly discussed in sociobiology. Strictures for protection of= kin are strong, but so are relations of reciprocity—“Do unto others as = you would have others do unto you,” “love your neighbor as yourself,” and these with the pervading expectation that care for oth= ers will yield rewards in heaven. Yet, there are also those teachings which promote non-reciprocal behavior involv= ing self-sacrifice, “love your enemies” (Matt 5:43), “forgive [others] seventy times seven”(Matt. 18.24), “When reviled, we bless, when persecuted we endure, when slandered we try to conciliate (1 Cor. 4:12-13).

&= nbsp; This variety has posed a challenge for Christian interpretation, and competing priorities of one type of love or another have existed since the outset of = the religion. Against this tradit= ion of diversity, a standardizing trend, which has operated for at least five hund= red years, has recently become very successful. During the last 60 years, Christian ethics in the West, particularly in the United States, has come to de-emphasize agape as sacrifice.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Previously, many quarters of Prote= stant thought emphasized love as self-sacrifice over against self-regard, while Catholicism, emphasizing love as acquisitive caritas, posed a balance betwe= en regard for the self and the other. &n= bsp; Gradually, however, the self-sacrifice of the strong agape ethic of = Kierkegaard or Anders Nygren or the mitigated agape ethic of Reinhold Niebuhr or Paul Ramsey has become significantly less influential (Andolsen, 1981). Gene Outka has played a significan= t role in this transition with his portrayal of Christian love as a mutuality which balances regard for self and others. = According to him, Christians do not have a strict obligation to perf= orm self-sacrificial acts. Instead sacrificial love is superogatory and at the discretion of the individual (Outka, 1992). Certain femini= st authors have supported this emphasis. Finding the ethic of self-sacrifice posed as a Christian duty only f= or females, they seek a correction by the application to both sexes of a stand= ard of mutual love including self regard (Browning, 1992, Andolsen, 1981, Walstedt, 1977, an= d Post, 1990).

&= nbsp; Given this shift and the apparent irrationality of sacrificial agape to many contemporary minds, one may wonder why sacrificial altruism appears in the Christian canon at all. Group selection provides two suggestions. First, Christian agape could be a memetic hitchhiker. In genetic terms a hitchhiker is a= gene which perhaps had some purpose in the past but now does nothing to enhance = the survival of the organism and yet is replicated and passed to offspring along with the genes that do contribute to survival (= Dawson, 1999). Christian sacrificial love, then, remains among the canonical memes = of Christianity, but it no longer has a function in the life of the community. =

&= nbsp; Second, Christian agape is part of a strategy of costly signaling. In order to identify and remove free-riders who might enjoy the benefits of cooperation in Christianity wit= hout believing in its tenets or contributing to its mission, sacrificial love is enjoined of all members as a belief and as a practice (Sosis, 2000 & So= sis, 2003). From this perspective,= the diminishment of sacrifice as a Christian obligation is perhaps the result o= f an increasing emphasis on high membership numbers and lessening worries about = free riders.

&= nbsp; Particularly if this last suggestion is true, the shift away from sacrificial agape foreshadows significant problems for Christianity. From a sociological perspective, a= ny religion which separates itself from its costly signaling rituals runs the = risk of becoming unable to sustain the within-group cooperation necessary to maintain its identity and not lose members to competing communities (Irons, 2001). Arguably, sacrifice is= less important in Christianity because it has been co-opted by the modern nation-state. Many contempora= ry Christians would find it more reasonable to sacrifice themselves for their nation-state than for their faith community.

Some ethicists concerned by the dominance of na= tional identity over religious identity have suggested that Christianity needs to = make its community of interest more extensive than a particular nation-state. Gene Outka advocates Christian lov= e as “universal in scope” (Outka, 1992), and even the Mennonite John Howard Yoder finds “the commonality of humankind” as a platform= to overcome territorialism (Yoder, 1992).&nbs= p; Unfortunately, while the ethic that results is rationally high-minde= d, it is not distinctively Christian. One may follow self-sacrifice on the basis of rational principalism without specific religious commitments.&nb= sp; For example, research indicates that many of those who put themselve= s at risk to rescue Jews from the Nazis did so not out of religious motivation b= ut out of a sense that as human beings Jews deserved to be rescued (Monroe, Barton, & Klingemann, 1990). &nbs= p; If this kind of ethic can be achieved without Christianity, then why= is Christianity needed, and why should the meme of sacrificial agape be preser= ved?

&= nbsp; The deeper problem with principlism is that it does not match the memetic base = of the New Testament. The New Testament speaks of sacrificial agape not in terms of a species-wide commun= ity, but in terms of an eschatological community, the Church. This community is the framework fo= r the transforming powers of God begun in the resurrection of Christ and extendin= g to the culmination of the end of the age.&nbs= p; As prophetic of the already present and yet approaching new age, the church suffers in the inadequacies of the present as part of the divine for= ces transforming the cosmos (Moltman, 1967).&n= bsp; The lapse in interest in a sacrificial agape in the Christian commun= ity then is traceable to a lapse in the belief in the eschatological vision of = the New Testament.

The Future of Sacrifical Agape

&= nbsp; Evolutionary biology records the development of new species and the extinction of others. Anthropology chronicl= es the rise and fall of human civilizations and religions. In contrast, contemporary Christia= nity presumes that as a community it is indestructible, because God will preserve it, and therefore its traditions can be interpreted in the most comfortable= and desirable way. That approach = does not match the patterns of successful communities, and it does not match the underlying memetic tradition of the religion.

&= nbsp; A central principle of natural selection is diversity. An organism, or group, is better a= ble to meet new and unanticipated challenges when it has a variety of genetic combinations and adaptations preserved in its identity. This is the source of recent cauti= ons in regard to genetic manipulation. When one changes the genetic identity of an organism or plant, one d= oes not know the effects of that change for the survivability of the species. One may introduce a weakness which= some common parasite can exploit, or one may make the whole species so uniform t= hat some new contagion throws it into extinction. The waning importance of sacrifici= al love in Christianity poses a similar danger. The Christian canon contains diver= se interpretations of love, developed and tested over considerable time. While it can be argued that sacrif= icial agape is the dominant motif, the diversity of memes in the Christian canon provides a vitality that has contributed to Christianity’s survival.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> The relatively recent advent of po= litical individualism and the modern nation-state have injected a new priority into this ancient memetic identity, and its results are not yet fathomed. Contemporary Christianity may alre= ady have become a different memetic community than it was 2000 years ago. If these changes allow the communi= ty to compete successfully with new social challenges, then they can be claimed as adaptive. If, however, they c= ause the religion to lose its distinctive voice and its dynamic for social cohes= ion, then they are destructive mutations.

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